La predicabilità dell’essere in Francesco d’Appignano. La relazione creatore/creatura tra univocità ed equivocità
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DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63277/2385-1341/2703Abstract
La teologia dell’inizio del XIV secolo rifiuta generalmente la dottrina dell’analogia dell’essere. Secondo molti studiosi, la posizione di Francesco d’Appignano su come e con riferimento a che cosa ‘essere’ sia predicato (la sua ‘predicabilità’) sembra condividere sia il modo in cui Scoto concepisce la relazione tra intelletto e volontà in Dio, sia l’affermazione di Ockham secondo la quale esso è semplicemente un concetto, che non può denotare alcuna cosa reale (una sostanza o un accidente). Considerata attentamente, la posizione di Francesco risulta, tuttavia, del tutto originale, basata com’è su una precisa differenza a proposito del modo in cui intelletto e volontà interagiscono nella Trinità divina e nelle creature, permettendo al contempo di strutturare diversi livelli di connotazione del termine ‘essere’ che attenuano la radicale posizione di Ockham sull’equivocità. In conclusione, il contributo di Francesco d’Appignano sulla predicabilità di ‘essere’ mostra quanto variegato e non specificamente subordinato all’insegnamento di qualche preciso maestro sia il dibattito tardo medievale su un tema fondamentale della teologia.
Early XIVth century Theology generally refuses the doctrine of the analogy of being. Among scholars, Francis of Marchia’s position on how and as regards to what ‘being’ is predicated (its ‘predicability’) apparently shares both Scotus’ way of conceiving the relationship between intellect and will in God, and Ockham’s claim that ‘being’ is just a concept, which can not denote any real thing at all (a substance or an accident). Carefully considered, Marchia’s position is actually a peculiar one, as it is based on a precise difference between divine Trinity and creatures on the way intellect and will interact, and at the same time allows to range several levels of connotation of ‘being’, which attenuate Ockham’s radical claim for equivocity. Therefore, Marchia’s contribution on the predicability of ‘being’ shows how varied and not specifically subject to any master’s via is the late medieval debate on a crucial topic of Theology.
