The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and Natural Law

Published

2025-12-19 — Updated on 2026-01-28

Versions

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63277/gsc.v50i.4674

Authors

  • Michel Troper Université Paris

Keywords:

Natural law, Kelsen, human rights, evidence, arts, emotion

Abstract

The interpretation of past institutions depends on the political moment of interpretation and on methodological presuppositions linked to theoretical options. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen has been interpreted, depending on the circumstances, sometimes as a proclamation of natural law without legal consequences, sometimes as the production of a standard of constitutional value. These differences are largely due to circumstances (the development of the control of the constitutionality of laws), but largely to a certain conception of natural law which would only have the function of serving as a criterion of validity of positive law. We will attempt to show that the 1789 declaration is based on another conception of natural law, which has a different function: to provide justification for an authority whose power does not derive from a positive norm. This natural law is far from having disappeared from modern legal systems.

Author Biography

Michel Troper, Université Paris

Professeur émérite de droit public à l’Université Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense.