The Prime Minister in the Hot Seat. The Executive Power in the United Kingdom from World War I to the Aftermath of World War II

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Published

2026-07-06

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63277/gsc.v51i.5361

Authors

  • Diederick Slijkerman University of Leiden

Keywords:

Constitutional relationships, State Intervention, Centralization, Executive Dominance, Prime Ministerial Government

Abstract

The period from the First World War to the end of the seventies shows a radical constitutional change from parliamentary sovereignty, in which the Cabinet was accountable towards Parliament, to a cabinet government dominated by the Prime Minister, accountable towards the House of Commons and especially the constituencies. Apart from the constituencies, the position of the Prime Minister developed as a powerful state power. World War I demanded an unprecedented mobilization of people and capital. To manage the immense effort required to combat the central powers, the state had to centralize its operations. This necessity for swift, centralized decision-making shifted the center of traditional parliamentary debate to direct executive action. In 1916, the Cabinet Office was created to organise Cabinet meetings more systematically. The period between the First and Second World War was marked by a fundamental tension in the exercise of executive power. On the one hand people craved for the pre-war free market with limited state power, but on the other hand the war had further normalized the idea that the state, and especially
the executive power, could have an active role in managing society and the economy. World War II was a people’s war. The people supported the decisive Churchill, but after the war was convincingly won, they disposed of him. The executive power saw an extraordinary centralisation of authority, made possible by emergency legislation. As a result of the collective effort during the war, the emphasis of the population and the government went to the need of a welfare state. After the war, the executive used its authority to address post-war poverty and social inequality. Moreover, it had to deal with nationalisation of industry and decolonization, which in a way were also calculated interests. The 1960s and 1970s revealed a paradox. Formally, the executive retained wide constitutional powers and succeeded in the transition from an imperial world power to a modern nation-state, in
which the former dominions played a role within the framework of a common wealth. Practically, its authority was increasingly constrained by social-economic challenges and a growing role of public opinion. This inertia was lifted by Thatcher, who modernized the British executive by further centralizing power and introducing neoliberal reforms. Concluding, wars and external threats tended to strengthen the executive power, while economic crises, minority governments, and organised social forces often weakened it. Confronted with an external threat, people need a strong leader and it is granted by the voters and parliament. In weak
social-economic times, voters and parliament are more powerful, because voters feel it immediately, and parliament indirectly because members of parliament are blamed for it. So in the end, it is a play of four c’s: Cabinet with the Prime Minister, Crown, Commons and constituency.