Are there common national traditions regarding the responsibility of the executive power?

Abstract

Answering this question is (obviously) very difficult, if not impossible. This is first and foremost as an invitation to reflection, to be included in a broadly comparative perspective. The responsibility of the executive power is, as is well known, a key element enabling us to determine the nature of a political-constitutional regime. Thus, the history of this highly important ‘machinery’ is relevant to the reframing of contemporary issues in terms of principles and general frameworks. It can be useful to grasp the longue durée and structural elements and logics of the responsibility of the Executive. Our aim is simply to highlight certain aspects that emerged in the course of the nineteenth century. Yet it was of course the ‘Atlantic triangle’ involving Great Britain, the United States of America and France in the course of the eighteenth century that determined the basic contours of the concept, developing three different constitutional experiences. The paper deals then with some fundamental ‘classics’ and in particular Benjamin Constant’s doctrine, very influential in the European debate during the 19th century. A first attempt to sketch a comparative constitutional history of executive power responsibility may serve to bring out some common features and to answer affirmatively, albeit in general, to the
question contained in the title of this article. At the same time, it shows us the multiplicity and variety of experiences and tools, highlighting several turning points, phases, contexts, and different modes of legitimation. The fact that we use the same words (executive power, government, responsibility, impeachment, etc.) does not mean that nothing has changed. The greater part of the concepts and issues regarding Europe today are linked to a long historical legacy rich in deviations, changes and intertwinings.