How to defend the democratic principle when elections and parchment barriers fail. A realistic approach to constitutional democracy

Abstract

Since the Seventies, the use of the expression “crisis of democracy” has grown in a confused and improper manner both in political theory and comparative politics. In this sense, the article provides a critical assessment of some of the existing bases of democratic theory that we usually take for granted. It implies to read again the mainstream idea of elections and separation of powers with a modest share of skepticism. For instance, the conditions under which many democracies are attacked from within are showing that elections are no longer the first defense of constitutional democracy. Similarly, many systems of separation of powers fail to limit the majorities to overthrow democracy. Accordingly, the problem is to define a new research agenda on democratic defenses and political risks. Firstly, the article debunks the idealized vision of the elections. Secondly, it demonstrates how majorities can neutralize parchment barriers structuring the separation of powers in contemporary democracies. It considers a more realistic approach to politics and institutions rather than a past naive idealism about the principles of checks and balances. Thirdly, it argues for a radical recasting of the idea of constitutional democracy. In this vision, democracy is in crisis when its institutions are attacked from within by incumbents who use democratic means against democratic aims. Finally, the last part of the article deals with the development of the concept of democratic strength as the key capacity of democracies to resist untouched over time while preserving their constitutional and political identity.