L’ombre du platonisme mathématique critique dans la conception des êtres quantitatifs absolus chez Francesco d’Appignano (l’infini, le temps, le nombre)
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DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63277/2385-1341/2705Abstract
Cette étude se propose d’étudier la réception aristotélicienne du platonisme
mathématique reçu par Francesco d’Appignano, pour mesurer l’influence d’un Platon, que l’on croit perdu au Moyen Âge, sur l’ontologie de ses accidents quantitatifs. En effet, bien que la critique platonicienne ne connaisse pas une grande extension dans l’oe uvre de Francesco d’Appignano,
elle y restitue plusieurs arguments traditionnels de l’Aristote arabe qui souhaite invalider les positions de son prédécesseur, mais qui, en réalité, peine à vraiment résoudre les problèmes soulevés par Platon sur la place de s mathématiques dans la division des sciences, sur le statut de
la forme par rapport à la matière génératrice de multiplicité et sur la structure de l’infini. Ces trois aspects critiqués par Aristote, présents dans l’oeuvre de Francesco et non résolus, dést abilisent l’ontologie aristotélicienne, en provoquant de vifs débats chez les médiévaux, pour faire apparaître chez Francesco et malgré lui, un phénomène de contagion d’un platonisme
résistant, qui influencerait l’ontologie absolue de ses êtres quantitatif s.
This study on the Aristotelian reception of mathematical pl atonism received by Francesco d’ Appignano, aims to measure the influence of a Plato, believed lost in the Middle Ages, on the ontology of his quantitative accidents. In fact, although the Platonic criticism does not know a great exten sion in the work of Francesco d’ Appignano, it restores several traditional arguments
of the Arab Aristotle who wishes to invalidate the positions of his predecessor, but fails to really solve the problems raise d by Plato on the place of mathematics in the division of sciences, on the status of form in relation to the matter generating multiplicity and on the structure of the
infinite. These three aspects criticized by Aristotle, present in Francesco’s work and u nresolved, destabilize Aristotelian ontology, by provoking lively debates among the medieval commentators, to make appear in Francesco and in spite of him, a phenomenon of contagion of a resistant platonism, which would influence the absolute ontology of h is quantitative beings.
