

---

# PICENUM SERAPHICUM

RIVISTA DI STUDI STORICI E FRANCESCANI

---

ANNO XXXVIII (2024)

NUOVA SERIE

---



PROVINCIA PICENA "S. GIACOMO DELLA MARCA" DEI FRATI MINORI

---



eum edizioni università di macerata

---

# PICENUM SERAPHICUM

## RIVISTA DI STUDI STORICI E FRANCESCANI

---

### **Ente proprietario**

Provincia Picena "San Giacomo della Marca" dei Frati Minori  
via S. Francesco, 52  
60035 Jesi (AN)

### **in convenzione con**

Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici-Lingue, Mediazione, Storia, Lettere, Filosofia  
corso Cavour, 2  
62100 Macerata

### **Consiglio scientifico**

Felice Accrocca, Giuseppe Avarucci, Francesca Bartolacci, Monica Bocchetta, Rosa Marisa Borraccini, Giammario Borri, Giuseppe Buffon, David Burr, Alvaro Cacciotti, Alberto Cadili, Maela Carletti, Maria Ciotti, Mario Conetti, Jacques Dalarun, Maria Consiglia De Matteis, Carlo Dolcini, Christoph Flüeler, György Galamb, Gábor Győr iványi, Robert E. Lerner, Jean Claude Maire-Vigueur, Alfonso Marini, Enrico Menestò, Grado G. Merlo, Jürgen Miethke, Antal Molnár, Lauge O. Nielsen, Roberto Paciocco, Letizia Pellegrini, Luigi Pellegrini, Gian Luca Potestà, Leonardo Sileo, Andrea Tabarroni, Katherine Tachau, Giacomo Todeschini

### **Consiglio direttivo**

Roberto Lambertini (direttore), Francesca Bartolacci (condirettrice), Monica Bocchetta, Maela Carletti, Pamela Galeazzi, p. Lorenzo Turchi

### **Comitato di Redazione**

Nicoletta Biondi, p. Marco Buccolini, Laura Calvaresi, p. Ferdinando Campana, Agnese Contadini, Daniela Donninelli, Noemi Fioralisi, p. Simone Giampieri, Roberto Lamponi, p. Gabriele Lazzarini, Costanza Lucchetti, Francesco Nocco, Luca Marcelli, Gioele Marozzi, Chiara Melatini, Annamaria Raia

### **Redazione**

Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici-Lingue, Mediazione, Storia, Lettere, Filosofia  
corso Cavour, 2  
62100 Macerata  
redazione.picenum@unimc.it

### **Direttore responsabile**

p. Ferdinando Campana

### **Editore**

eum edizioni università di macerata  
Palazzo Ciccolini, via XX settembre, 5 – 62100 Macerata  
tel. 0733 258 6080  
<http://eum.unimc.it>  
[info.ceum@unimc.it](mailto:info.ceum@unimc.it)



**eum** edizioni università di macerata

# Indice

3 Editoriale

## Studi

9 Francesco Fiorentino  
Il rapporto fra intelletto e volontà in Francesco di Appignano

27 Andrea Nannini  
*Dicit quidam Doctor et multum pulchre in hac materia.* ‘Comunicazione’  
e ‘produzione’ tra metafisica e teologia trinitaria in Francesco  
d’Appignano e Giovanni da Ripa

69 Antonio Petagine  
Francis of Marchia against the Unity of the Intellect

97 Tiziana Suarez-Nani  
Ancora una sfida alla fisica aristotelica? Francesco di Appignano e  
la co-locazione dei corpi

115 Edit Anna Lukács  
Robert Halifax OFM on the Middle Act of the Will

133 Martina Maria Caragnano  
Lo *speculum imperatoris* di Dialogo 3.2 e il *De regimine principum*:  
alcune ipotesi di confronto

163 Francesco Giuliani  
*L'affiliatio* nei Minori Conventuali: un caso di espulsione dalla  
prospettiva della Congregazione del Concilio (XVII sec.)

193 Gloria Sopranzetti  
«Fuit vir turbolentus, amicusque novitatum». Padre Valentino  
Pacifici tra religione e bibliofilia

## Note

- 225 Maria Teresa Dolso  
Donne e uomini nel francescanesimo delle Marche
- 245 Deborah Licastro  
Il palazzo comunale di Cingoli
- 253 Roberto Lamponi  
Il mondo dei Cappuccini. Tra storia, società, arte, architettura. Cronaca del convegno (Pesaro, Auditorium Palazzo Montani Antaldi, 19-21 settembre 2024)

## Schede

- 261 *Atlante storico di Cingoli*, a cura di Francesca Bartolacci, eum, Macerata 2024, 320 pp. (N. Fioralisi); *The Economy of Francesco. Un glossario per riparare il linguaggio dell'economia*, a cura di S. Rozzoni, P. Limata, Città nuova, Roma 2022, 355 pp. (F. Polo); Monica Bocchetta, Maria Maddalena Paolini, «Vi gettò le prime fondamenta». *Il beato Pietro Gambacorta, Montebello e i Girolamini. Excursus storico-artistico*, Fondazione Girolomoni Edizioni, Isola del Piano 2024, 155 pp. (G. Marozzi); *La Biblioteca storica di Palazzo Campana*, a cura di Monica Bocchetta, Giulia Lavagnoli, con la collaborazione di Costanza Lucchetti, Osimo, Istituto Campana per l'Istruzione Permanente, Andrea Livi, Fermo 2023, 127 pp. (M. Carletti); Gioele Marozzi, *Percorsi nell'Epistolario di Giacomo Leopardi. La storia e le caratteristiche riemerse*, eum, Macerata 2023, 374 pp. (A. Contadini).

Studi

# Robert Halifax OFM on the Middle Act of the Will

Edit Anna Lukács

## *Abstract*

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the emergence of a middle act of the will especially by Franciscan thinkers challenged the traditional, twofold division of the acts of the will. Critical of the new trend, Robert Halifax OFM opted for returning to the Augustinian understanding of the acts of the will. This paper investigates his rejection of a middle act of the will in question 4 of his Questions on the Sentences and ties it to his theory of change in question 5.

Before the thirteenth century, Augustine's theory of the acts of the will dominated Western cultures. According to Augustine, the acts of the will are twofold: either enjoyment or use. With enjoyment, the will is oriented toward God; with use, it is oriented toward everything else. Thus, man is virtuous toward other men, and takes delight in God. In Peter Lombard's wording, "To enjoy is to inhere in something with love, for its own sake; but to use, that which in use comes to refer to obtaining that which ought to be enjoyed: any other is abuse"<sup>1</sup>. From the late

\* I thank Monika Michalowska for our many discussions over Robert Halifax, including this paper.

<sup>1</sup> K. Georgedes, *The Serpent in the Tree of Knowledge: Enjoyment and Use in Fourteenth-Century Theology*, Wisconsin, MA 1995, p. 37. For Augustine, see Augustinus, *De doctrina christiana*, I.1, ed. by J. Martin, Turnhout 1962, pp. 8-9: "Fruere est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam. Ut autem, quod in usum venerit, ad id, quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. ... Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus eademque trinitas, una quaedam summa res communisque omnibus fruentibus ea,

thirteenth century onward, a gradual change took place: a middle act of the will was introduced. This “new” act permitted exactly what its absence did not allow for: men could enjoy a human being, use God, or have a neither sinful, nor virtuous, but neutral attitude toward either the human being or God. No doubt, the concept was versatile; also, it was discussed only with caution. A breakthrough in its history occurred when the Franciscan Robert Halifax devoted an entire question to the middle act of the will in his Questions on the *Sentences*<sup>2</sup>.

Little is known about Robert Halifax (also called Elephat, Eliphath or Elephax). Based on the sources Halifax quotes in his Questions on the *Sentences*, William Courtenay dates the beginning of Halifax’s academic career at the University of Oxford to around 1336–1338, whereas Alfred B. Emden indicated the earlier date of 1332. The first official documents reveal him in the role of the 56<sup>th</sup> lector at Cambridge around 1336. Halifax was also a Franciscan monk, at Doncaster Convent<sup>3</sup>. Only his

si tamen res et non rerum omnium causa, si tamen et causa.” As Georgedes notes, Lombard’s reading of Augustine contains slight differences: Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., pp. 38-39.

<sup>2</sup> Literature on the middle will is scattered: W. J. Courtenay, *Between Despair and Love. Some Late Medieval Modifications of Augustine’s Teaching on Fruition and Psychic States*, in *Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology*, ed. by K. Hagen, Leiden 1990, pp. 5-18, in particular pp. 17-18; Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., passim (with analysis of a middle act of the will by Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, and William Ockham); R. B. Szuj, *Adiaphorie und Kunst. Studien zur Genealogie ästhetischen Denkens*, Tübingen 2005, pp. 55-90 (on Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol); S. Kitanov, *Peter of Candia on Demonstrating that God is the Sole Object of Beatific Enjoyment*, «Franciscan Studies», 67 (2009), pp. 427-489, in particular p. 442 note 42; S. Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates. The Complex Legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard*, Plymouth 2014, pp. 86-87, 94-95, 124, 127, 131.

<sup>3</sup> W. J. Courtenay *Some Notes on Robert of Halifax*: OFM, «Franciscan Studies», 33 (1977), pp. 135-142, in particular p. 139; A. B. Emden, *A biographical register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500. Volume II: F to O*, Oxford 1958, pp. 850-851; A. B. Emden, *A biographical register of the University of Cambridge to 1500*, Cambridge 1963, p. 280; A. Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert*, Rome 1949, p. 303 (proposing sometime between 1332 and 1343 (!) for Halifax’s lectures); J. Marenbon, *Introduction: New Perspectives on the Early Fourteenth-Century Universities, and Cambridge as a Centre of Intellectual Life*, in *King’s Hall, Cambridge and the Fourteenth-Century Universities. New Perspectives*, ed. by J. Marenbon, Leiden 2020, pp. 1-26, in particular pp. 10, 19-20; K. Michalski *Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, «Studia philosophica», 2 (1937), pp. 233–365, in particular pp. 310-312, 348-349.

“commentary” on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* composed of nine questions on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* books I and II has survived<sup>4</sup>. An almost obsessive enquiry about the will characterizes it. Courtenay notes that within the context of fourteenth-century Oxford commentaries on the *Sentences*, the preoccupation with the will is hardly remarkable. Commentaries on Lombard’s *Sentences* by Richard Kilvington, Thomas Buckingham, and Monachus Niger were just as concise and focused on the will as Halifax’s<sup>5</sup>. Notwithstanding, as Courtenay also remarks, Halifax’s question 4 attracted considerable attention from his contemporaries, most notably at the University of Paris. Entitled *Whether, between enjoyment and use, there is a middle act that is neither enjoyment nor use*, question 4 forms indeed the most influential question among Halifax’s questions on the *Sentences*.

There is another fundamental moment in Halifax’s questions on the *Sentences*, which proves relevant to the present investigation. Halifax’s commentary exemplifies in a remarkable way the influence of the Oxford

<sup>4</sup> Courtenay, *Some Notes* cit., pp. 135-142; Georgetes, *The Serpent* cit., p. 287 note 5; R. Sharpe, *A Handlist of Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540*, Turnhout 1997, p. 552. The manuscript transmission reflects the strong influence of Halifax outside of England: all sixteen extant copies of the work are to be found in European libraries on the continent. That works of Oxford thinkers are no longer extant in England, but only on the continent is further attested in the manuscript tradition of several contemporaries of Halifax. E.g., Richard Kilvington’s commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and Richard Swineshead’s *Liber calculationum* highlight a similar distribution. C. Cardelle de Hartmann, *Lateinische Dialoge 1200-1400. Literaturhistorische Studie und Repertorium*, Leiden 2007, pp. 535-537 record a second, philosophical work “perhaps” written by Halifax, entitled *Dialogus curiosus de formalitatibus inter unum Dunsistam et unum Ockhamistam*. The study of Halifax’s Questions on the Sentences tends to confirm Halifax as the author of the *Dialogus*: in the latter, the same authors are quoted in the same style, and Walter Burley’s influence is as tangible as in Halifax’s questions on the *Sentences*.

<sup>5</sup> Free will is the “most voluminously debated of all philosophical problems” according to R. Kane, *Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will*, in *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. by R. Kane, Oxford 2011<sup>2</sup>, p. 1. Except for Richard Kilvington, none of the above-mentioned Oxonian philosopher’s theories of will have been extensively studied in the past four decades. On Richard Kilvington, see the works of M. Michalowska, and *Willing and Understanding. Late Medieval Debates on the Will, the Intellect, and Practical Knowledge*, ed. by M. Michalowska and R. Fedriga, Leiden 2023. On Monachus Niger, who perhaps also taught at Cambridge around the same time as Halifax, see Marenbon, *Introduction* cit., p. 15 note 36; p. 21 note 65.



Calculators' new mathematics and conceptual tools on theological and ethical questions. This influence opens a rare window on commentaries on the *Sentences* from the 1330s at Oxford, out of which only the works of Roger Roseth and Richard Kilvington, similar on several points to Halifax's approach, have been studied in recent years<sup>6</sup>. Owing to the Oxford Calculators, a method conceived and used in natural philosophy became seminal in ethics and theology. Spiritual motion, ethical change, virtuous growth, and vicious decay were subject to mathematical demonstration, arithmetical and geometrical proof and calculation<sup>7</sup>. Especially ethical change formed part of a much-debated new approach, that is, the quantification of different qualities as varying latitudes or intensions and remissions of forms. These latitudes, as Joel Kaye notices, were also connected to the notion of a "middle":

With the first generation of Calculators in the fourteenth century, the latitude moved closer to its eventual identification of a measuring continuum. Walter Burley ... used the latitude as a way of ordering and representing the indivisible degrees a quality obtained when moving between its contraries through its mid-point, as, for example, moving from perfect whiteness to perfect blackness. Burley cited book II of Aristotle's *Ethics* (on the *medium* of virtue) to support his position that the *medium* between two contraries is difficult to determine with precision. This is the same locus

<sup>6</sup> On Roger Roseth, see the works of Olli Hallamaa, e.g. O. Hallamaa, *Continuum, Infinity and Analysis in Theology*, in *Raum und Raumvorstellungen im Mittelalter*, ed. by J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer, Berlin 1998, pp. 375-388, in particular pp. 380-388. Question 7 in Halifax's commentary on the *Sentences* titled *Whether only the divine essence is an intensively infinite perfection* (*Utrum sola essentia divina sit perfectio infinita intensive*) stands in line with Roger Roseth's question 5, article 2.

<sup>7</sup> E. A. Lukács, *Calculations in Thomas Bradwardine's De causa Dei, Book I*, in *Quantifying Aristotle: The Impact, Spread, and Decline of the Calculatory Tradition*, ed. by D. A. Di Liscia and E. D. Sylla, Leiden 2022, pp. 106-125; Id., *Robert Halifax, an Oxford Calculator of Shadows*, «Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval», 29 (2022) 1, pp. 77-96; M. Michalowska and E. A. Lukács, *Calculatory Ethics. Methods, Arguments, and Cases. An Introduction*, in *Calculating Ethics in the Fourteenth Century*, ed. by E. A. Lukács and M. Michalowska, Leiden 2024, pp. 1-25; M. Michalowska and E. Jung, *Scotistic and Ockhamist Contributions to Kilvington's Ethical and Theological Views, in 1308. Eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit*, ed. by A. Speer and D. Wirmer, Berlin 2010, pp. 104-122; M. Michalowska, *Richard Kilvington's Use of Physical and Logical Arguments in Ethical Dilemmas*, «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», 22 (2011), pp. 467-494; Id., *The Concept of Habit in Richard Kilvington's Ethics*, in *The Ontology, Psychology and Axiology of Habits (Habitus) in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. by N. Faucher and M. Roques, Berlin 2018, pp. 347-364.

where Aquinas introduced the term “latitude”, and it shows the continuing connection between ethical thought and the physical concept of an approximating range<sup>8</sup>.

This relatedness of latitudes and the middle act of the will, although not directly, is also present in question 5 in Halifax’s commentary on the *Sentences* titled *Whether any act of the will could be suddenly produced by the will*.

Thus, in the first part of this paper, I investigate Halifax’s account of the will and its middle act, then in the second part, the rejection of the middle act of the will from the influential question 4. Finally, in the third part, related to the will’s acts and their change, I offer a brief overview of Halifax’s theory of latitudes of forms from question 5.

### *The Will and Its Middle Act*

The middle act of the will first appeared in discussions of the beatific enjoyment in book I, distinction 1 of commentaries on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*<sup>9</sup>. While “middle” means here that the act of the will is conceived as the arithmetical average between enjoyment and use, the concept’s precise meaning and importance varied from one thinker to the other. Franciscan thinkers created the core of its tradition. As Kimberley Georgedes tells us in her work about the changing patterns of enjoyment and use titled *The Serpent in the Tree of Knowledge*, John Duns Scotus might have been the first to introduce the concept of a middle—or, in his own

<sup>8</sup> J. Kaye, *Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century. Money, market exchange, and the emergence of scientific thought*, Cambridge 1998, pp. 185-186.

<sup>9</sup> See Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., p. 4. Investigations of “middle” concepts also occurred in natural philosophy. For instance, Monika Mansfeld analyses Oxford thinkers’ use of a so-called “middle color,” in which the proportion between white and black is perfectly even: M. Mansfeld, *The Middle Color: A history of a problem in thirteenth century Oxford commentaries on De sensu et sensato*, «Analiza i Egzystencja», 54 (2019), pp. 127-154, in particular p. 137. Color is an example Frost also uses about Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of qualities in individuals that can be described with latitudes: G. Frost, *Aquinas on the Intension and Remission of Accidental Forms*, «Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy», 7 (2019), pp. 116-146, in particular p. 117. Color appears in Halifax’s investigations too; see e.g. Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 5, in Paris, f. 73rb (for expanded reference to the ms., see note 16).

formulation “neutral”—act of the will. On the opening pages of his *Ordinatio*, Scotus defined three acts of the will: enjoyment, use, and a third one, alternatively labeled “neutral” act or “middle assent,” which was neither enjoyment nor use. With this act, the will assented to an object, but did not refer it to some other good:

As it is within the power of the will to choose or not to choose, so is the mode of willing in its power, namely to refer or not to refer; therefore, it is within the will’s power to choose some good for its own sake, not referring it to another good<sup>10</sup>.

Scotus grounded this not-referring act in the superiority of the will. The will does not simply receive the intellect’s command, for it is a freer power than the intellect. Therefore, the will cannot only enjoy or use, it can also choose to neither enjoy, nor use<sup>11</sup>.

Scotus was followed by Peter Auriol, who stated that such neutral act of the will is concerned with friendship: the neutral act is produced when someone desires something good for the sake of his or her friend. This act is neither a sin, nor a virtuous act. After all, friendship allowed, as Georgedes put it, for “a certain ‘equality’ which could conceivably allow one to choose and love an object for its own sake”<sup>12</sup>. With William of

<sup>10</sup> Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., p. 165. John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, lib. I, dist. 1, ed. C. Balić, in *Opera omnia*, II, Vatican 1950, p. 10: “... sicut in potestate voluntatis est velle vel non velle, ita in potestate eius est modus volendi, scilicet referre vel non referre; ergo in potestate sua est aliquod bonum velle propter se, non referendo ad aliquod bonum...”

<sup>11</sup> John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, lib. I, dist. 1, p. 51: “Praeter autem istos duos assensus voluntatis est aliquis assensus medius, quia voluntati potest ostendi aliquod bonum absolute apprehensum non sub ratione propter se boni, nec propter aliud bonum. Voluntas autem circa tale sic ostensum potest habere aliquem actum et non necessario inordinatum, ergo potest habere actum absolute volendi illud absque relatione ad aliud aut absque fruitione propter se, et ulterius potest imperare intellectui ut inquirat quale bonum illud sit et qualiter volendum, et tunc illi assentire.” See also Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., pp. 180-189.

<sup>12</sup> Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 1, ed. E. M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, NY 1952, pp. 434-435: “Ex hoc ultimo sequitur quod aliquando bonum creatum diligitur propter se, ut scientia et virtutes et similia; nec actu homo refert illa in Deum; nihilominus homo non peccat nec etiam meretur quia talis actus nec usus est, nec fruitio, sed in potentia utrumque. Usus non est, quia actu non refert; fruitio non est quia non existimat irreferibile, nec figit se ad non referendum; et idcirco actus ille quantum est ex se nec meritorius, nec demeritorius est censendus.” Georgedes devotes an extensive

Ockham, the concept gained yet another recognition: God could be the object of a middle act of the will (but not one's friend). In what appears as a major disruption with previous traditions, Ockham denied that God being the ultimate end of man can be rationally demonstrated. Consequently, one can also choose the seemingly absurd act to love the first being without having faith in him: this too is a middle act of the will, which is neither enjoyment, nor use, and the object of which is God<sup>13</sup>. No other theologian from Ockham's generation elaborated further on the concept<sup>14</sup>.

Halifax's question 4 stands out in this succession of events. Out of the nine questions that compose his Questions on the *Sentences*, Halifax devoted four to different issues regarding the human will. Question 4 is the first in the series:

Question 4: *Whether between enjoyment and use, there is a middle act of the will, which is neither enjoyment nor use.*

4.1. *Whether every being can be an object of enjoyment in general.*

4.2. *Whether enjoyment and pleasure are the same thing*<sup>15</sup>.

4.3. *Whether everything else besides God should only be used as related to God as the ultimate goal and only as such.*

4.4. *Whether only God can be enjoyed.*

4.5. *Whether the will of the wayfarers can enjoy God based only on their natural capacities.*

section to Auriol: Georgetes, *The Serpent* cit., pp. 190-244, in particular pp. 203-205, 241-242 note 8.

<sup>13</sup> William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, prologus et distinctio prima*, ed. G. Gál, St. Bonaventure, NY 1967, p. 373: "Secundo ostendo quod Deo sit utendum ... Et sic intelligendo quaestionem dico quod 'uti' dupliciter accipitur, scilicet large et stricte. Large est omnis actus voluntatis, secundum beatum Augustinum; stricte autem accipitur secundum quod est aliquis actus voluntatis distinctus contra frui." See Georges, *The Serpent* cit., pp. 245-274, in particular p. 269; Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment* cit., pp. 86-87.

<sup>14</sup> Except for Robert Holcot, on whom see Kitanov, *Beatific Enjoyment* cit., pp. 94-95. Thomas Bradwardine mentions an *actus medius* in only one place in *De causa Dei*: Thomas Bradwardine, *De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum* I, 43, ed. H. Savile, London 1618, p. 401.

<sup>15</sup> On Scotus's position on this topic, see Georgetes, *The Serpent* cit., pp. 180-186.

4.6. *Whether someone who is in a state of charity knows that he or she is in the state of charity.*

4.7. *Whether it is possible for the rational nature to enjoy the divine essence and not to enjoy the divine person*<sup>16</sup>.

Question 5: *Whether any act of the will could be suddenly produced by the will.*

5.1. *Whether the act of the created will can be intensified or diminished*<sup>17</sup>.

Question 6: *Whether the will is free with respect to any of its acts and objects*<sup>18</sup>.

6.1. *Whether the will behaves actively or passively toward its act.*

6.2. *Whether the will of the blessed can cause an act of hate of God.*

6.3. *Whether something else than the will can effectively cause the will's act.*

6.4. *Whether it is more difficult for the will to freely elect one part of a contradiction than the other.*

6.5. *Whether the will can be impeded.*

6.6. *Whether every will can have an act concerning a being.*

6.7. *Whether from any degree of an interior act, if we presuppose the power to act, an exterior operation will follow or not.*

<sup>16</sup> All quotes in this paper will be from ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15880, 'Paris' from here onward, the most complete copy of Halifax's commentary on the *Sentences* known today. Unless stated otherwise, all translations are mine. Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, ff. 38vb-65rb: *Utrum inter frui et uti sit aliquis actus voluntatis medius qui nec fruitio, nec usus*; 4.1, in Paris, ff. 40rb-41vb: *Utrum omne ens possit esse obiectum fruitionis in communi*; 4.2, in Paris, ff. 42ra-51vb: *Utrum fruitio et delectatio sint eadem res* (with a *dubitatio* on ff. 44rb-46rb on naturally caused infinite joy); 4.3, in Paris, ff. 41rb-41vb: *Utrum omni alio a Deo solum propter Deum tamquam propter finem ultimum sit utendum et solum taliter*; 4.4, in Paris, ff. 51vb-55vb: *Utrum solo Deo sit fruendum*; 4.5, in Paris, ff. 55vb-61ra: *Utrum ex puris naturalibus possit voluntas viatoris frui Deo*; 4.6, in Paris, ff. 61ra-63rb: *Utrum existens in caritate sciat se esse in caritate*; 4.7, in Paris, ff. 63rb-65rb: *Utrum rationali naturae sit possibile frui essentia divina non fruendo divina persona*.

<sup>17</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 5, in Paris, ff. 65rb-77vb: *Utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit esse subito productus*, 5.1 in Paris, ff. 67ra-77vb: *Utrum actus voluntatis creatae possit intendi vel remitti*. There are three additional *dubitationes* on f. 74r.

<sup>18</sup> On questions 5 and 6 see Michalowska and Lukács, *Calculatory Ethics. Methods, Arguments, and Cases. An Introduction* cit., p. 7 note 21. For a more detailed examination of the mss. and Halifax's theses in Oxford debates, see Ch. Schabel, *The Oxford Franciscan Robert Halifax's Principial Debate over Grace and Merit with His Pelagian Socius and Other Colleagues in 1332-1333*, in *Principia on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Exploring an Uncharted Scholastic Philosophical Genre Across Europe*, ed. by M. Brinzei and W. O. Duba, Turnhout 2024, pp. 634-672.

6.8. *If the intellect perceives an object as simply good, having no unsatisfactory nor bad conditions, [the question is] whether the will still cannot will that object, even if this intellectual approach is present.*

6.9. *[Whether] if someone wants to undergo martyrdom for God from charitable love for God, and persecutors that would put her/him to death are absent, he or she would still merit [for the desire of martyrdom]<sup>19</sup>.*

Question 9: *Whether every act of the will, which would be chosen in disagreement with one's erroneous conscience, would be without merit.*

9.1. *Whether ignorance by an adult of divine or canonical law in those matters, which are necessary for salvation, is without sin.*

9.2. *Whether, if someone is said to will an act absolutely, they have to have a cognition with regard to that act, without which it would be impossible to have that act.*

9.3. *Whether an adult should not be ignorant about things necessary for their salvation for the time for which they are necessary.*

9.4. *Whether someone can be expected to do the impossible.*

9.5. *Whether someone who is in the state of grace can be undecided between two sins<sup>20</sup>.*

<sup>19</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 6, in Paris, ff. 77vb-108vb: *Utrum voluntas respectu cuiuslibet actus sui et obiecti sit libera*; 6.1, in Paris, ff. 82rb-85rb: *Utrum voluntas se habet active aut tantum passive respectu sui actus*; 6.2, in Paris, ff. 85rb-88va: *Utrum voluntas beati possit causare actum odii Dei*; 6.3 in Paris, ff. 88va-90rb: *Utrum aliquid aliud a voluntate possit causare effective actum voluntatis*; 6.4, in Paris, ff. 90rb-94rb: *Utrum difficilius sit voluntati libere elicere unam partem contradictionis quam aliam*; 6.5 in Paris, ff. 94rb-97ra: *Utrum voluntas possit difficultari*; 6.6, in Paris, ff. 97ra-98rb: *Utrum omnis voluntas possit habere actum circa quodcumque ens*; 6.7, in Paris, ff. 98rb-102rb: *Utrum ex quocumque gradu actus interioris praesupposita potentia sequatur operatio exterior (correxerit ex interior) vel non*; 6.8, in Paris, ff. 102rb-107vb: *Si per intellectum apprehenditur aliquod obiectum tamquam bonum simpliciter nullam contradictionem displicibilem vel malam habens, si stante illa apprehensione voluntas non posset nolle illud obiectum*; 6.9, in Paris, ff. 107vb-108vb: *[Sed hic videtur esse dubium: Nam ex hoc sequitur quod] qui ex dilectione caritativa Dei vult subire martyrium propter Deum, si non adessent persecutores qui eum ad mortem ponerent, tamen mereretur.*

<sup>20</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 9, in Paris, ff. 147va-158ra: *Utrum omnis actus voluntatis difformis conscientiae suae erronee elicitus sit demeritorius*; 9.1, in Paris, ff. 152va-153rb: *Utrum ignorantia iuris divini vel canonici in hiis quae sunt necessaria ad salutem in adulto sit sine peccato*; 9.2, in Paris, ff. 152vb-153rb: *Si aliquis teneatur ad aliquem actum absolute pro illo isto modo tenetur habere cognitionem sine qua talem actum non poterat habere*; 9.3, in Paris, ff. 153rb-154rb: *[Aliud dubium est de hoc quod dicitur quod] quilibet adultus tenetur non habere ignorantiam*

Question 4 discusses different aspects about the middle act of the will. Sub-question 4.1 asks whether being implies the possibility of ‘enjoyment in general’. The concept of ‘enjoyment in general’ was a concept introduced by John Duns Scotus; it included both ordinate and inordinate or illicit enjoyment, and absolute enjoyment<sup>21</sup>. Sub-question 4.2 also traces back to Scotus’s *Ordinatio* book I, distinction 1, where Scotus defines enjoyment as an act of the will and not as a passively received pleasurable sensation, a topic to which he devoted entire questions. Scotus’s approach, reflected here, confirms what we have seen about his invention of the middle act: a strong motivation to view the will as a power free to choose anything<sup>22</sup>. Sub-question 4.3 asks whether only the act of use can concern human being (or, in other terms, whether the human being could be enjoyed). Sub-question 4.4 continues on the topic of 4.2, and links enjoyment to pleasure or delectation (*delectatio*) about God as the exclusive object of enjoyment. The last three sub-questions focus on enjoyment as an act in the afterlife.

Question 4 starts with the Scotist definition of the middle act of the will: a middle act of the will is caused when the intellect presents a good thing to the will, which is neither good for its own sake, nor for the sake of another. In its freedom greater than the intellect, the will chooses to have a middle act with regard to such an object<sup>23</sup>. Halifax provides a list of six arguments in favor of assuming such an act of the will. Two concrete examples (arguments 3 and 4) in his list shall be singled out: a middle act of the will is formed, on the one side, when one gives alms from natural piety, and, on the other side, when one doubts whether an

*iuris divini vel canonici in his quae sunt ad salutem pro illo tempore pro quo sunt necessaria*; 9.4, in Paris, ff. 154rb-157rb: *Utrum quis teneatur ad impossibile*; 9.5, in Paris, ff. 157rb-158ra: *Utrum existens in gratia possit esse perplexus inter duo peccata*. Halifax discusses in several places the juridical relevance of the will and its acts.

<sup>21</sup> See Georgetes, *The Serpent* cit., pp. 151-154.

<sup>22</sup> John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, lib. I, dist. 1, p. 64: “Voluntas actu elicito amat Deum; aut ergo propter aliud, et tunc utitur, et ita est perversa, aut propter se, et tunc fruitur, et ita frui est actus.” For the translation, see Georgetes, *The Serpent* cit., p. 172.

<sup>23</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, f. 38vb: “Quod sic, probatur quia voluntati potest ostendi aliquod bonum absolute apprehensum per intellectum non sola ratione propter se bonum, nec propter aliud bonum.”

apparition is God's manifestation or not<sup>24</sup>. In the first case, there is no use of the human being; in the second case, there is no enjoyment of God. The middle act of the will concerns either a human or the divine being. As Halifax points out, to assume a middle willing act of the will entails that there is a middle nilling act of the will as well. In the context of the middle act of the will, nilling endorsed a significant status it rarely reached in Western philosophy<sup>25</sup>. Yet, Halifax refused this approach and the concept altogether.

### *The Refutation of the Middle Act of the Will*

Halifax's arguments against the middle act of the will are first derived from authorities. He starts with considerations from Anselm's *De concordia* and *De casu diaboli* and focuses on two ideas: on the necessity of the will's orientation at the ultimate good when the will is acting well, and on the problematic absence of merit when the will is assenting to something good, yet from neutral motives. He proposes quotes from several works of Augustine, which he uses to confirm that the acts of the will cannot be something else than an alternative between enjoyment and use. He also assumes that only God can be the object of enjoyment<sup>26</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, ff. 38vb-39va; esp. f. 39ra: "Propterea: Possum velle dare elemosiam pauperi tamen naturali pietate non referendo actum illum ad Deum quo fruendum est, nec referendo ad aliud quo non fruendum quia nullo alio a Deo est fruendum .... Propterea: Intellectui potest tale bonum ostendi quod nec novit propter se esse diligendum, nec propter aliud, quia dubitare potest de isto utrum sit Deus vel creatura. Hoc non includit contradictionem quia licet in beatifica visione beatus non possit dubitare de aliquo ipsum esse Deum, tamen in cogitatione naturali non videtur inconveniens."

<sup>25</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, f. 39vb: "Per eandem rationem qua posset esse velle inter fruitionem et usum, posset esse nolle talem inter fruitionem et usum quia eodem modo quo posset praesentari aliquod voluntati sic volubile, posset praesentari voluntati obiectum oppositum contra aliquibus circumstantiis oppositis, et per consequens nolle, sed medium est." On the importance of nilling in the theology of Peter Auriol, see Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., p. 198.

<sup>26</sup> See Anselmus, *De casu diaboli*, cap. 13, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, I, ed. F. S. Schmitt O.S.B.; reprint Edinburgh 1938, pp. 255-258; Id., *De concordia*, lib. III, cap. 13, in *Opera Omnia*, II, ed. Schmitt, repr. Edingburgh 1938, pp. 285-287;



From four works, Halifax draws the following series of inferences:

- 1) Not every being can be the object of general enjoyment since there are also objects that the will does not will because they do not appear under any good reason (*sub ratione boni*).
- 2) Only God is the object of an ordered enjoyment, for only God is the object of an ordered enjoyment.
- 3) Any being can be the object of use in general, because every being is capable of behaving toward another through the will.
- 4) Anything other than God can be the object of an ordered use, because every such thing is an object of an ordered use that the will can will for its use.
- 5) Every nilling act of the will is an act of use, since every nilling presupposes willing.
- 6) Anything the will wills, it wills it for its own sake or for the sake of another<sup>27</sup>.

The last inference is the only assumption with a philosophical - specifically, an Aristotelian - foundation, yet not so typical for a discussion about the middle act of the will. According to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX.8, only nature and the will are *per se* acting entities, but every such entity acts toward a goal. According to Averroes's

Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, f. 39rb: "Nulla voluntas movetur ab aliquo obiecto nisi secundum affectionem alicuius commodi vel iusti, et omnis talis est actus fruendi vel utendi, igitur omnis actus voluntatis fruendi vel utendi, ergo nullus medius. ... Omnis motus actualis quo movetur voluntas secundum affectionem commodi vel iusti est actus fruendi vel utendi."

<sup>27</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, ff. 39vb-40ra: "Prima conclusio est quod non quodlibet potest esse obiectum fruitionis in communi ostensum in facultate sui solus propter se et non propter aliud. ... Secunda conclusio: Solum Deus est obiectum fruitionis ordinatae quia illud est obiectum fruitionis ordinatae quod est propter se diligendum, sed solum Deus est huiusmodi, igitur. ... Tertia conclusio: Quodlibet ens potest esse obiectum usus in communi quia quodlibet ens potest referre voluntas ad aliud, igitur. ... Quarta conclusio: Omne aliud a Deo potest esse obiectum usus ordinati quia omne tale est obiectum usus ordinati quod voluntas potest ordinate assumere in facultate voluntatis propter aliud, sed omne aliud a Deo est huiusmodi, igitur, etc. ... Quinta conclusio ... omnis talis actus voluntatis quo ordinatur ad alium actum est actus utendi, igitur omne nolle est actus utendi. Item: Omne nolle praesupponit velle, igitur est actus utendi. ... Sexta conclusio: Voluntas quidquid vult, vult propter se vel propter aliud."

commentary on this section in the *Metaphysics*, in every voluntary act, the agent acts toward a goal, while the intellect does not act for the sake of something else, but as a principle. Halifax closes the series in quoting *Nicomachean Ethics* I.7, where Aristotle assumes that the intellect and, consequently, the will have the same goal<sup>28</sup>. This thesis contradicts for instance Scotus's interpretation that the will is freer than the intellect and can have an additional, middle assent. Halifax even remarks that it is the intellect's role, and not the will's, to decide about the will's attitude toward the object: "I say that the intellect is able to ponder whether something is to be loved for its own sake or for the sake of something else"<sup>29</sup>. Finally, Halifax quotes the three types of charity Aristotle posited in the *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.3, namely *amor honesti, utilis, and delectabilis*, but these three charities are either enjoyment or use, as he notices<sup>30</sup>. Thus, this last inference answers the dilemma of the two practical examples mentioned above: giving alms from natural piety, in Halifax's view, is definitely use, while having a divine vision without certainty is enjoyment.

Halifax's refutation of the middle act of the will accounts for the will as an entity, the activity of which is always oriented toward a final goal. How does the will change in Halifax's mind? While it constitutes the most powerful part of Halifax's refusal of a middle act of the will, his answer to this question turns out most contemporary and intriguing.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.8 (1168a32-1169a36), trans. D. Ross, Oxford 1971, pp. 234-238; I.7 (1097a15-1098b28), pp. 11-15.

<sup>29</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, f. 40va.

<sup>30</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 4, in Paris, f. 40ra: "Iterum: Omnis amor quo aliud amatur vel est amor honesti vel utilis vel delectabilis, sed omnis talis est fruitio vel usus, ergo maior patet per Philosophum 8 Ethicorum ubi dividit amabile in ista tria bona: in bonum, scilicet honestum, delectabile et utile. Minor patet per eundem." See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.3 (1156a6-b17), pp. 195-197. John Buridan will have a very different use of this threefold division, on which see K. Walsh, *Buridan on the Connection of Virtues*, «Journal of the History of Philosophy», 24 (1986) 4, pp. 453-482.

*The Intension and Remission of the Acts of the Will*

Halifax was already confronted in question 4 with the intensification of the moral status of an individual. Question 5, which asks whether it is possible for the will to suddenly produce its act, contains only one sub-question, which focuses exactly on this topic: Can the acts of the will be intensified and diminished? Halifax's answer proceeds as if the acts of will were qualities, and their change, intension and remission of forms. Yet, from the beginning, Halifax makes clear that changes in corporeal qualities such as heat and whiteness do not happen in the same way as changes to spiritual qualities: while the former are extrinsic changes, the latter are intrinsic motions. An additional feature of the will is its indivisibility, like the subject to which it is coextensive: the will forms an atomic component of the individual. Yet, according to Halifax, volitions produced by the will are composed of infinitely many volitions. Halifax describes their relationship to the will and its acts as follows:

Any such part of a quality and the whole are of the same species, therefore, every part of the volition is volition, since when such an act is increased, that which first was the whole, will become the part, and when it is decreased, that which was first the part, is afterwards the whole<sup>31</sup>.

In his negative reply to the question (no, the acts of the will can neither intensify, nor diminish), Halifax cites eight arguments<sup>32</sup>. His inferences, then, conclude to the contrary:

<sup>31</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 5, in Paris, f. 67ra: "... cuiuslibet qualitatis talis pars et totum sint eiusdem specie, igitur omnis pars volitionis est volitio, quia quando intenditur talis actus, quod primo fuit totum postea est pars, et quando remittitur, quod primo fuit pars, postea est totum." A few lines before, Halifax stated: "...actus voluntatis non potest intendi, nec remitti sicut aliae qualitates corporales ut caliditas et albedo, etc. Et arguitur sic: Omne tale quod intenditur et remittitur, producitur vel corrumpitur per partem ante partem. Sed actus voluntatis non producitur vel corrumpitur, etc., quia indivisibilis sicut subiectum in quo est, etc., igitur non intenditur vel remittitur, etc."

<sup>32</sup> Halifax's arguments are complex and at times amusing for the modern reader. They calculate sums of mortal (*odium Dei*) and venial sins, the merits of baptized children, Socrates's will to kill Plato, etc.; see Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 5, in Paris, ff. 67rb-76va.

- 1) No finite power can create or destroy something.
- 2) No thing without composing parts can be produced by a finite power.
- 3) No thing produced by a finite power is produced suddenly and instantaneously. Every thing produced by a finite power is produced with motion, and every such thing is produced in time. Therefore, no such thing is produced suddenly.
- 4) No thing that is divisible only according to its extension can be intensified and diminished, since every such thing can be divided only into distinct parts with regard to location.
- 5) Every thing that is divisible according to its intension or into parts that are not distinct with regard to location can be intensified and diminished.
- 6) Every act chosen by the created will is produced by a finite power, since every such act is produced by a will, and therefore by a finite power.
- 7) Every such act is produced in time, etc.
- 8) Every act of the will can be intensified or diminished, etc.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, the will, created by an infinite power, is a non-composite entity. Volitions, produced by a finite power, which is the willing subject, are composite entities. Their change is intensification or remission. Also, Halifax reformulates these inferences in terms of latitudes of forms.

As Kaye notices, in the 1330s at Oxford, the “question of qualitative change was of such importance, and the progression of positions was so

<sup>33</sup> Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 5, in Paris, ff. 69va-70ra: “Nulla finita potentia potest aliquid producere vel corrumpere. Nulla res carens partibus est producibilis a potentia finita. Nulla res producta a potentia finita producitur subito et in instanti, nam omnis res producta a potentia finita producitur per motum et omnis talis producitur in tempore, igitur nulla talis subito producitur. Nulla res divisibilis solum secundum extensionem est intensibilis vel remissibilis, quia omnis talis res est solum divisibilis in partes distinctas secundum situm, sed nulla talis res est intensibilis et remissibilis. Omnis res divisibilis secundum intensionem sive in partes non distinctas secundum situm est intensibilis et remissibilis. Omnis actus elicited a voluntate creata est productus a potentia finita, quia omnis talis actus producitur ab ipsa voluntate, igitur a potentia finita. Omnis talis actus producitur in tempore, etc. Omnis actus voluntatis potest intendere vel remitti, etc.” Inferences 9 to 12 that I omit to quote here focus on the intensification and remission of merit and demerit.

marked to contemporaries, that outlines of the historical development of this concept began to appear within contemporary philosophical debates”<sup>34</sup>. On a similar note, Halifax accounts for the different opinions about the intension and remission of forms. He enumerates four theories<sup>35</sup> and describes their relevance for the will and its acts as follows:

- 1) The first opinion relates to the admixture theory: forms are intensified or diminished in interacting with their contraries. The forms intensified or diminished in this opinion are the corporeal forms, for this theory does not work in the case of spiritual forms like the act and habit of the will.
- 2) The corporeal, spiritual or accidental forms are intensified or diminished in generating or producing nothing new: this is the perfection theory, the oldest among the theories on the intension and remission of forms.
- 3) The “most famous” opinion says that the accidental, corporeal, and spiritual forms are intensified by the addition of a new form to the subject: this is the addition theory. This theory was the one the core Oxford Calculators adopted.
- 4) The fourth opinion holds that every accidental form is produced intensively and successively, and thus *per partem ante partem*: this is the succession theory. The Franciscan Walter Chatton and Walter Burley were upholders of this opinion<sup>36</sup>.

<sup>34</sup> Kaye, *Economy and Nature* cit., p. 186.

<sup>35</sup> Thomas Aquinas worked with a threefold schema; see Frost, *Aquinas on the Intension* cit.; also R. Wood, *Calculating Grace: The Debate about the Latitude of Forms According to Adam Wodeham*, in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. S. Knuuttila, R. Työriñoja and S. Ebbesen, Helsinki 1990, pp. 373-391, where Halifax’s theory 2 is missing, and theory 1 is opposed to theories 3 and 4.

<sup>36</sup> Michalowska and Lukács, *Calculatory Ethics* cit., citation on pp. 15-16 note 53. Halifax further addresses the question of light in this context (Paris, f. 76rb-vb), which was connected to the multitude of forms by Walter Burley and later by Richard Swineshead too: H. Shapiro, *Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms*, «*Speculum*», 34 (1959), pp. 413-427; E. D. Sylla, *Medieval Quantification of Qualities: the “Merton School”*, «*Archive for History of Exact Sciences*», 8 (1971), pp. 7-39, in particular pp. 25-28; Id., *Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators*, «*Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du*

Halifax adhered to the fourth opinion, albeit combined it with the third opinion: forms are changed through new forms – or through new forms that effectuate smooth change<sup>37</sup>.

### *Conclusion*

Robert Halifax's refusal of a middle act of the will shows him as an original, more, intriguing thinker and conciliator of divergent traditions; one, whose reading of historical sources in question 4 and their connection to contemporary approach to the acts of the will in question 5 resulted in an interesting mixture. While in question 4, he constituted a traditional account of the will; in question 5, he was innovative. In particular Halifax's thorough knowledge of theories of motion invented by his contemporaries, the first Oxford Calculators, and his supposed proximity to Walter Burley urge the most for a more in-depth analysis. This implies the sourcing of Halifax's arguments in order to assess both the nature of his approach and the metaphysical foundations of his theories of motion and change<sup>38</sup>.

Although many of Halifax's sophisticated arguments went missing on the continent, his metaphysical and ethical theses continued to play a significant role in later discussions. As John Murdoch already noticed, Halifax was influential at fourteenth-century University of Paris: the

Moyen Âge», 40 (1973), pp. 223-283; Id., *Walter Burley's Physics commentaries and the Mathematics of Alteration*, «Early Science and Medicine», 6 (2001), pp. 149-184; Id., *The Oxford Calculators' Middle Degree Theorem in Context*, «Early Science and Medicine», 15 (2010), pp. 338-370. Walter Burley in fact changed his mind regarding the latitude of forms; see M. Gensler, *Kłopotliwa zmiana czyli Waltera Burleya zmagania ze zmiennością rzeczy*, Łódź 2007, pp. 174-175. Interestingly, Kilvington criticized Burley's theory, see Michałowska, *Richard Kilvington's Use* cit., p. 481; while Gregory of Rimini, who, as a good Augustinian, followed Halifax on the refusal of the middle act of the will, adhered to the addition theory that Halifax rejected; see C. L. Loewe, *Gregory of Rimini on the Intension and Remission of Corporeal Forms*, «Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévales», 81 (2014) 2, pp. 273-330. On Walter Chatton OFM's theory of forms, see Wood, *Calculating Grace* cit., pp. 382-383.

<sup>37</sup> See also Robertus Halifax, *Quaestiones in Sententias*, q. 6, in Paris, f. 93vb.

<sup>38</sup> For further aspects of Halifax's adhesion to the Oxford Calculators, see Lukács, *Robert Halifax, an Oxford Calculator of Shadows* cit.

Augustinian Gregory of Rimini, and the Cistercians John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons among others discussed his ideas, developed on his conceptual tools or simply copied pieces of his questions on the *Sentences* into their works<sup>39</sup>. These discussions continued at the University of Vienna, where adopting or rejecting the middle act of the will remained a debated issue until at least the first decades of the fifteenth century<sup>40</sup>.

This story does not only prove of historical relevance. The middle act of the will unfolds new metaphysical perspectives to explore. To sketch only one such novelty: the middle act of the will was not only used about the human will, but about the divine will too. According to this view, God wills the sins of human beings with a middle act of his own will<sup>41</sup>. This transposition of the middle act of the will into God shows not only how widespread the concept was, but points also to its subversive character. In sum, both its impact and relevance are much greater than what Georgedes had suspected in her groundbreaking work<sup>42</sup>.

<sup>39</sup> See J. E. Murdoch, *Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons*, in *Machaut's World. Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century*, ed. by M. Pelner Cosman and B. Chandler, New York 1978, pp. 51-86; E. A. Lukács, *Martyrs Who Do Not Die: Robert Halifax on Supererogation*, in *Calculating Ethics in the Fourteenth Century* cit., pp. 142-162, in particular pp. 159-160.

<sup>40</sup> Peter of Pirchenwart devotes extensive discussion to different aspects of a middle act of the will in 1417. For instance, in a dispute with one of his fellows, on the question whether enjoyment of human beings is possible, Peter writes the following: Petrus de Pirchenwart, *Commentarius in IV Sententiarum, Principium*, in ms. Göttweig, Benediktinerstift, 261/272, ff. 13vb-14ra: "... quodlibet tamen ens potest esse huiusmodi fruitionis obiectum, quia cum prima parte istius conclusionis stat meum corollarium. Quartum: eo quod talis dilectio non esset fruitio utique ex dictis similiter stat cum secunda parte suae conclusionis quam nec assero, nec reprobo, licet eius oppositum esset probabiliter sustinibile, quemadmodum et Elephat et sui sequaces probabiliter defendunt et sustinent".

<sup>41</sup> Henry of Langenstein, a German master educated at the University of Paris, active at the University of Vienna toward the end of 14<sup>th</sup> century, opposed Thomas Bradwardine's idea that God fully wills the human being's sins, with the idea of a middle act of the will in God, which is neither willing, nor nilling: Henricus de Langenstein, *Commentary on Genesis*, part 3, in ms. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 3902, f. 222ra-rb. Langenstein additionally accepted a middle assent, the meaning of which is different from all previous accounts known so far; see *ibid.*, ff. 205ra-va. See also E. A. Lukács, *Immovable Truth. Divine Knowledge and the Bible at the University of Vienna (1385-1419)*, Leiden 2024, in particular p. 21, p. 21 note 56.

<sup>42</sup> Georgedes, *The Serpent* cit., in particular p. 298.